Stratégie et Management des organisations
"Un livre unique, qui donne une vision complète du management, à jour des dernières évolutions dans les pratiques.
Les thèmes majeurs enseignés dans les masters traitant du management des entreprises sont présentés et développés :
- Environnement économique de l'entreprise
- Stratégie de l'entreprise
- Information comptable
- Gestion des RH
- Méthodes d'aide à la décision
- Management des opérations
- Finance d'entreprise
- Management interculturel
- Management des SI
- Contrôle de gestion
- Organisations et comportements
- Pilotage des performances
- Management de projet
Un ouvrage de référence pour les étudiants ou toute personne cherchant à acquérir une connaissance approfondie du fonctionnement des entreprises."
Pour en savoir plus : http://www.editions-eyrolles.com/Livre/9782212555509/master-management-d...
Since the publication of Oliver Williamson’s Economic Institutions of Capitalism in 1985, new institutional economics approaches have increasingly been used to understand strategic challenges. A forthcoming volume of Advances in Strategic Management (Vol. 26, June 2009) brings together the disparate strands of new institutional economics-based strategy research in a single comprehensive source. The full content is here.
Eric Brousseau and I contributed a chapter "Contracting with Government"
Un nouvel article de Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström. Je vous joins le résumé:
The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights, emphasizes that the ownership of assets — and thereby firm boundaries — is determined in such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It is generally accepted that this approach applies to owner-managed firms better than to large companies. In this paper, we attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach by developing a simple model with three key ingredients: (a) decision rights can be transferred ex ante through ownership, (b) managers (and possibly workers) enjoy private benefits that are non-transferable, and (c) owners can divert a firm’s profit. In our basic model decisions are ex post non-contractible; in an extension we use the idea that contracts are reference points to relax this assumption. We show that firm boundaries matter. Nonintegrated firms fail to account for the external effects that their decisions have on other firms. An integrated firm can internalize such externalities, but it does not put enough weight on the private benefits of managers and workers. We explore this tradeoff in a model that focuses on the difficulties companies face in cooperating through the market if the benefits from cooperation are unevenly divided; therefore, they may sometimes end up merging. We show that the assumption that contracts are reference points introduces a friction that permits an analysis of delegation.
Pour télécharger le papier : http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/12/firm-scope-dec-18-2008-pdf.pdf