Institutions et organisations

The Call for Papers is out for the International Society for New Institutional Economics’s 2010 meeting, 17-19 June in Stirling, Scotland. Proposals are due 1 March. Keynotes from Bruno Frey and 2009 Nobel prizes: Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson. I will be there! Even if it will (probably) rain.

Can external agents successfully impose significant institutional reforms? Many economists are sceptical.

After 1792, French armies invaded and reformed the institutions of many European countries. Crucially, European polities did not choose the French institutions. Those institutions were imposed on them, first by the Revolution and then by Napoleon. The package of reforms the French imposed on areas they conquered included the civil code, the abolition of guilds and the remnants of feudalism, the introduction of equality before the law, and the undermining of aristocratic privilege. Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2009) argue in a recent paper that the impact of the French Revolution on the institutions of Europe can be seen as a “natural experiment” that sheds light on the question of the efficiency of imposed institutional reforms.

1st ESNIE Post-doctoral Workshop

Crise économique et financière oblige, la confiance dans les entreprises et dans leurs dirigeants est en chute libre au niveau mondial. C'est l'un des enseignements de la dixième édition du baromètre de confiance mis au point par le réseau de relations publiques international indépendant Edelman.

Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Insights from Jean-Jacques Laffont’s last book

Antonio Estache, a good friend of mine and one of my favourite author wrote a very interesting paper on the lessons that can be learned from Jean-Jacques Laffont's papers on institutions and development. The paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Litterature. One of the main argument is that "Developing economies are often described as “economies with missing markets.” In the contractual world of regulation, missing markets translate into incomplete contracts. Contracts are incomplete because of players’ bounded rationality, as in any economy—but also because of institutional weaknesses."

The first time I read Laffont's 2005 book on this issue I was fascinated by this idea and by the way he proposed a formalization of weak institutions and their impact on contracting choices and regulation. This paper takes stock and suggests we should go on following the path proposed by Jean-Jacques Laffont. I totally agree with this view.

An interview with Ronald Coase, I admire a lot (see my article with Elodie Bertrand), is available at the Online Library of Liberty. Clic Here for access.

Thanks a lot to Peter Klein who wrote this in his Organizations & Markets blog (he runs with other friends) which is always instructive or funny depending on the topic chosen!