NBER Working Group in Organizational Economics, November 20-21, 2009

Papers for Relational-Contracts Conference
NBER Working Group in Organizational Economics
Cambridge, MA
November 20-21, 2009

• Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt, “Reputation and Contract Design”
• Board, “Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty”
• Calzolari and Spagnolo, “Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening”
• Cooper and Kühn, “Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion”
• Dal Bó and Fréchette, “The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence”
• Desrieux, Chong, and Saussier, “Putting all one’s egs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the provision of local public services”
• Fong and Li, “Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics”
• Gil and Marion, “The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence for California Highway Procurement Auctions”
• Itoh and Morita, “Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem”
• McAdams, “Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership”
• Miller and Watson, “A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Transfers”

Program