



Working Paper No. RHS-06-069

January 16, 2009

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Stock Market Valuation of Rivals**

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Abstract

Most prior event studies find that the announcement of a new alliance is accompanied by a positive stock market response for the partners. This result has usually been interpreted as evidence for the prevailing view that alliances are effective vehicles for partners to acquire or access new skills and thus become stronger competitors. However, partners should also earn positive abnormal returns if alliances are used to shape competitive interactions, attenuating competitive intensity industry-wide.

In this study we disentangle these different mechanisms by examining how alliance announcements affect the stock market's evaluation of allying firms' *rivals*: If an alliance is expected to make partner firms more competitive, this should lead to negative abnormal returns for partners' rivals; if an alliance is expected to facilitate a reduction in competitive intensity, this should lead to positive abnormal returns for rivals. Results from an event study analysis of R&D alliances in the telecommunications and electronics industries during 1996-2004 provide evidence consistent with competition attenuation in some alliances. Our research thus challenges the increasingly narrow focus on learning and resource accumulation through alliances, and calls for broader consideration of the roles and effects of collaboration, both for individual firms and for industry structure.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Benjamin Cole, Klara Gotz, P.K. Toh, Brad van Wijk, and Maggie Zhou for able assistance in collecting, cleaning and compiling the various data elements for this project. We are grateful to seminar participants at Duke University, New York University, University of Paris (Sorbonne), University of Toronto, and York University for insightful comments.

Introduction

Over the last 20 years, the alliance has become an increasingly prevalent organizational form, particularly for technology development activities in knowledge-intensive industries. Academic literature on alliances has grown apace, as researchers seek to understand the mechanisms that link inter-firm collaboration to enhanced innovation and profitability. Early work on alliances by management scholars posited a variety of benefits that could accrue to alliance partners, including learning, access to specialized resources, risk sharing, and attenuating competition (Porter and Fuller 1986). Over time, however, some of these hypothesized alliance benefits have received disproportionate attention in the literature, while others have been relatively neglected. Indeed, recent research on alliances has tended to focus almost exclusively on alliances as vehicles by which partners acquire or access new skills to become stronger competitors. It has become less fashionable in strategy research to consider the potential for firms to use alliances to shape competitive interactions, possibly attenuating competitive intensity in the industry as a whole.

When looking for evidence of learning and other competitiveness-enhancing benefits of alliances, researchers have frequently turned to event studies, examining the stock market's response to a firm's announcement of a new alliance. Most find evidence that alliance announcements are, on average, accompanied by a positive stock market response, and that the magnitude of this response varies with the capabilities and experience of the partner (e.g., McConnell & Lantel 1985; Anand & Khanna 2000; Kale, Dyer & Singh 2002; see McGahan & Villalonga 2005 for contrary results). These findings have usually been interpreted as support for the competitiveness-enhancing view of alliances, whereby an alliance raises a firm's value by providing access to additional resources that enable it to out-compete its product-market rivals. However, positive abnormal returns to alliance partners are equally compatible with the competition-attenuation view of alliances, since in this case an alliance may increase total industry profits, some of which will accrue to alliance partners.

In this study we seek to shed light on the different mechanisms underlying value creation in alliances by examining how alliance announcements affect the stock market's valuation of allying firms' *rivals*. If an alliance is expected to enhance the resource portfolio of partner firms, making them stronger

competitors, then this should lead to negative abnormal returns for rivals when the alliance is announced. If an alliance is expected to facilitate a reduction in competitive intensity, however, then this should lead to positive abnormal returns for rivals as they will also benefit from the attenuation of competitive pressures (Eckbo 1983; Stillman 1983). Further, if an alliance is expected to make participants more potent competitors, then the magnitude of partner and rival abnormal returns should be inversely correlated (since the stronger that partners become, the more that rivals should be negatively affected); conversely, an alliance that is expected to soften competition should yield partner and rival abnormal returns that are positively correlated as all industry participants benefit from effective coordination by alliance participants.

We investigate the effect of firms' alliance announcements on rivals' stock market valuations through an event-study analysis of R&D alliances involving firms in the telecommunications and electronics industries (seven 4-digit SICs within SICs 366 and 367) announced during the period 1996 to 2004. We find that the abnormal returns accruing to rivals of the participating firms when a new alliance is announced are positively related to the returns accruing to the participants themselves. It is difficult to reconcile this finding with the idea that forming an alliance makes alliance participants more potent rivals. In addition, "horizontal" alliances, which link competitors active in the same product markets (and which we argue are particularly conducive to managing competition), have a positive impact on rivals' abnormal returns when compared with "vertical" alliances that link firms from different industries. In contrast, cross-border alliances – which we argue are less conducive to managing competition and more compatible with efforts to access new resources – are negatively associated with rivals' abnormal returns, indicating that such alliances generate greater competitive advantage for partners vis-à-vis rivals.

Our paper makes at least one theoretical and one empirical contribution to the alliance literature, and another, broader contribution. Theoretically, our paper draws on literature in industrial organization and strategy to unpack the alternative mechanisms by which alliances create value for partners – either by facilitating inter-partner learning and access to superior resources, such that the partners subsequently compete more fiercely with rivals, or by attenuating competitive intensity in the industry. Empirically, our study is the first examination of abnormal returns accruing to rivals upon the announcement of an

alliance. The results of this analysis, while not definitive, suggest that the recent exclusive focus on learning and resource accumulation through inter-firm alliances may be misplaced. By building on the work of forerunners in alliance research (e.g., Berg & Friedman 1977, 1981; Dixon 1962; Fusfeld 1958), we hope that this study will re-start a conversation about the appropriate balance between competitiveness-enhancement and competition-softening motivations for alliances.

Finally, and more broadly, this study employs a methodology – examining the effect of one firm’s action on the abnormal returns earned by its rivals – that is quite novel in strategy research and that can usefully be applied to inform a wide range of strategic actions. This method has been used only occasionally in prior studies in economics, and very rarely in the strategy literature.¹ Analyzing rivals’ abnormal returns has substantial potential, however, to shed light on other questions of competitive dynamics throughout the strategy field.

Alliance motives and outcomes for participants and rivals

When inter-firm alliances emerged as a popular organizational form in the early 1980s, interest in alliances among management scholars also took off. Early studies were primarily exploratory, examining the various benefits that may accrue to alliance partners in an effort to better understand the increasing popularity of these collaborative arrangements. Porter & Fuller (1986), for example, posited a variety of benefits that could accrue to alliance partners, including learning, access to specialized resources, risk sharing, and shaping competition (see Contractor & Lorange 1988 and Lorange & Roos 1992 for similar lists of alliance motives). As the literature on alliance formation and management has developed, however, it has increasingly embraced a tight focus around a resource-accumulation role for alliances to the exclusion of competition-shaping.

To some degree, this evolution of focus echoes a broader evolution in the economics and strategy literatures from anticompetitive to efficiency explanations of economic organization (Rumelt, Schendel &

¹ For example, Austin (1993) examines stock price reactions of rivals to the announcement of new patents, and Eckbo (1983) and Clougherty & Duso (2008) examine the effect of horizontal merger announcements on rivals’ abnormal returns. In a related vein, Megna & Klock (1993) and McGahan & Silverman (2006) examine the relationship between a firm’s Tobin’s q and the patenting of its rivals..

Teece 1991). In the 1950s through early 1980s, industrial organization economists tended to see collusion as ubiquitous, and the primary motive ascribed to any “nonstandard” arrangement was the desire to soften competition (Williamson, 1968). As this lens was applied to alliances, it is not surprising that such collaboration was viewed as a competition-softening device. Thus, for example, Fusfeld’s (1958) descriptive study of joint ventures in the iron and steel industry quotes from a 1952 Antitrust Law Symposium, to the effect that “a joint venture between large competitors, regardless of its purpose and regardless of how small it may be in relation to their total business will inevitably result in close association and collaboration between the parties” (1958, p. 586); he concludes that “...quasi mergers, like [joint ventures], should be immediately suspect...” (op cit., p. 597). Similarly, Berg and Friedman (1977, 1981) include in their list of motives for R&D collaboration in the US chemical industry, the idea that “Joint ventures may also serve as agents which facilitate market power, through horizontal integration, input supply restrictions, or market foreclosure” (Berg & Friedman 1977, p. 1330), and they interpret elevated rates of return for JV partners as possible evidence of market power (see also Berg, Duncan & Friedman 1982; and Dixon 1962, for similar commentaries).

Since the early 1980s, however, economists and strategists have increasingly favored efficiency explanations for most economic arrangements (Williamson 1985), and the application of an efficiency lens to alliances has contributed to the current focus on resource-based competitiveness-enhancement motivations for collaboration.² Studies of alliances as vehicles for inter-partner learning have become particularly prevalent in the strategy literature. Prior work in this stream includes practitioner-oriented assessments (e.g., Hamel, *et al.* 1988; Hamel 1991), theoretically-motivated field research (e.g., Inkpen & Dinur, 1992; Teece, 1992), and large-sample empirical analyses (e.g., Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 1996; Lane & Lubatkin 1998); all of these authors characterize alliances as vehicles for augmenting a firm’s technological resource base. A basic (though often implicit) premise of these studies is that internalization of partners’ skills as well as creation of new resources is a key motive and an important indicator of alliance success.

² A parallel shift occurred in international business research, for example regarding foreign direct investment, from explanations based on oligopolistic reaction (e.g. Knickerbocker 1976) to those emphasizing efficient exploitation of assets and resources (Kogut 1989).

Other authors (e.g., Nakamura, Shaver & Yeung 1996; Khanna, Gulati & Norhia 1998; Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell 2000) have highlighted a variant on the learning motive for alliances, whereby alliances facilitate co-specialization, rather than inter-partner learning *per se*. Here, partners continue to pursue their respective areas of specialization, deepening capabilities in these areas, and the alliance serves as a vehicle for assembling complementary capabilities and resources without the need for significant technology transfer or inter-partner learning. The European aircraft alliance Airbus Industrie, is an oft-cited example here, as member firms specialize in the design and manufacture of different components that are then brought together in the final aircraft (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 2002). The efficiency benefits ascribed to vertical alliances between suppliers and customers rest on a similar logic of deepening specialization and learning-by-doing while reducing information asymmetry in the vertical chain (Dyer & Singh 1998; Reuer & Koza 2000). Yet despite potentially different implications for alliance dynamics (Nakamura, Shaver & Yeung 1996), learning and co-specialization alliances share a common premise, that successful alliances enable partners to augment their resource base, and so gain a competitive advantage over rivals. This premise also extends to risk-sharing or scale-based alliance motives, common in resource exploration industries, where the elevated variance of returns from key activities motivate firms to share costs and hedge the risks of failure (Porter & Fuller 1986, p. 325).³

However, in addition to these capability- or competitiveness-enhancing benefits of alliances, it is also possible that alliances may play a role in shaping competition in an industry, as the previous discussion of earlier work in industrial organization suggests. Moreover, it is important to note that explicit collusion is not a necessary condition for alliances to dampen competitive intensity in an industry. As other IO models of R&D cooperation suggest (for example Katz 1986; Katz & Ordover 1990), R&D alliances can, in some circumstances, lead to a reduction in the level of R&D expenditure by alliance partners without explicit collusion. The resultant reduction in R&D output in turn has the potential to “soften” competition, even with rivals who are not involved in the alliance. Further, collaboration in R&D

³ Similar motives are sometimes attributed to large-scale R&D alliances in high fixed cost industries such as semiconductors or pharmaceuticals, although pooling of complementary capabilities almost certainly plays an additional role in such alliances.

may reduce the number of standards in a new technological area, reducing uncertainty surrounding a likely dominant standard and potentially increasing profitability for all firms in the industry as a result.

These two broad views of alliance motives and benefits generate conflicting hypotheses about the effect on rivals of a firm's decision to form an alliance. Specifically, the competitiveness-enhancement view implies that, *ceteris paribus*, an alliance will lead to lower future profits for rivals, while the competition-attenuation view implies that an alliance should lead to higher future profits for rivals. To the extent that capital markets accurately incorporate new information into the market values of publicly traded firms, the competitiveness-enhancement (versus competition-attenuation) view thus implies that the announcement of an alliance between two firms should lead to a decrease (versus an increase) in the market value of rivals to participating firms. Further, the competitiveness-enhancement view implies that the abnormal returns accruing to partners should be inversely correlated with those accruing to rivals, while the competition-attenuation view implies a positive correlation. These arguments are analogous to those in Eckbo's (1983) study of the impact of mergers on rival returns: rivals benefit when the effective number of independent producers in an industry is reduced; conversely, if a merger leads to fiercer competition among producers, rival returns suffer.

Of course, when establishing an alliance, the participants' motives may not fall exclusively into either the competitiveness-enhancement or competition-softening camp. For example, a research joint venture formed to collaborate in product innovation could have the effect of increasing partners' competitiveness, since each firm can now generate better products more quickly and cheaply than they could on their own. At the same time, the venture may have the effect of softening competition, since each firm can reduce R&D spending for a given level of innovation and thus slow their R&D "race" or otherwise reduce the intensity of their competitive interactions (Katz 1986). The key issues for our study are to 1) recognize that competition-softening can be a factor in alliances and 2) assess whether, and in what circumstances, competition-softening outweighs competitiveness-enhancement.

With respect to the circumstances that can be expected to promote competition attenuation, we can gain some insight by drawing on the previous studies of merger and joint venture activities cited

above, and assessing the likely benefits to accrue to different types of alliances. For example, if we compare horizontal alliances – that is, alliances between firms that compete in the same industry – with vertical alliances that bring together firms active in different but vertically linked industries, we would expect that horizontal alliances can more feasibly enable partners to manage product-market competition and are therefore more likely to lead to an increase in the market value of rivals to the allying firms, much as horizontal mergers are thought to more readily lead to softer competition (Eckbo 1983; Stillman 1983; Mueller 1985). Moreover, if we compare alliances organized as equity joint ventures with contractual alliances in which the partners retain a greater level of autonomy, one might expect that the “close association” that in Fusfeld’s (1958) view can foster anticompetitive behavior would be more likely to occur in joint ventures. However, we must be quite cautious before jumping to conclusions in this instance, since one could argue - and indeed some prior evidence exists – that the joint venture structure may also facilitate inter-partner learning and resource accumulation (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996). Similarly, alliance activities that extend beyond R&D to include marketing may be thought to facilitate collusive product market coordination (Berg & Friedman 1981), but it has been argued elsewhere that broadening the scope of R&D alliances to include manufacturing and marketing allows firms to bring the best product to market in the most timely fashion, thereby increasing the competitiveness of partner firms (Oxley & Sampson 2004).

Some other types of alliances are unambiguously *less* likely to foster competition attenuation. Cross-border alliances, for example, where partners come from different countries, are more likely to entail the introduction and joining of new, complementary skills, and are less suited to the type of product market coordination that could potentially benefit rivals (Hamel 1991; Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell 2000). As such, the impact on rivals is more likely to be negative upon announcement of cross-border alliances.

The empirical analysis below explores the extent of competitiveness enhancement versus competition attenuation by assessing the basic relationship between participant and rival returns following

an alliance announcement as well as these more nuanced predictions. But first we put our research in context by examining prior evidence on the stock market reaction to alliance announcements.

Event studies of alliance announcements

Event studies have become a popular method for examining the expected effect of an alliance on the value of participating firms. The basic idea behind the event-study methodology is that an examination of “abnormal” changes in a partner firm’s stock price following an announcement of a new alliance gives a good indication of informed traders’ beliefs regarding the expected impact of that alliance on future cash flows of the firm.⁴

Table 1 summarizes the theoretical and empirical focus and main findings for some of the most commonly cited event-study analyses of alliance announcements in the strategy literature. While not exhaustive,⁵ this sampling of studies captures the main flavor of findings to date: most of the studies find a positive abnormal return for partner firms following the announcement of an alliance, with average positive returns varying from less than 0.01% (Das, Sen & Sengupta, 1998) to 1.78% (Anand & Khanna 2000). The two notable exceptions to this consensus regarding the positive stock market reaction to alliance announcements come from Reuer & Koza (2000), who find that this reaction is limited to the subset of their alliances that are likely to take place under significant information asymmetry (and hence investors view an alliance as a favorable way to reduce such asymmetry), and McGahan and Villalonga (2005), who find no significant effect when analyzing the stock market reactions in a comprehensive sample of deals by 86 members of the Fortune 100 from 1990-2000.⁶

⁴ Details of the event study methodology can be found in the Methods section later in the paper.

⁵ For additional examples (also illustrating positive returns to alliance participants), see McConnell & Nantell (1985); Chan, Kensinger, Keown & Martin (1997); Crutchley, Guo, & Hansen (1991), and Kale, Dyer & Singh (2002). For a creative approach involving abnormal returns associated with alliance *termination*, see Reuer (2001).

⁶ As McGahan & Villalonga point out, one possible explanation for this divergent finding is that they study the largest firms in the economy and such firms are almost always the larger partners in their respective alliances; most prior studies have found that market values of small firms benefit disproportionately from alliances.

All of the prior studies that find a positive abnormal return to participants associate this effect with enhanced value creation within the alliance; indeed several of the studies explicitly draw the inference that alliances are effective vehicles for learning and/or resource accumulation (e.g., Koh & Venkatraman 1991; Kale, Dyer & Singh 2002). However, our earlier arguments suggest that such an interpretation may be premature, absent investigation of the effect of alliance announcements on the stock market reaction of rivals. We now turn to such an analysis.

Data and Methods

Our empirical analysis examines the abnormal returns that accrue to rivals upon announcement of R&D-related alliances involving firms in the telecommunications equipment and electronics industries (seven 4-digit industries within SICs 366 and 367) during the period 1996-2004. This is a useful setting for our study, as received wisdom suggests that profitability in these sectors depends critically on firms' abilities to create and commercialize new technologies quickly and efficiently (OECD 2000). Furthermore, as the electronic and telecommunications equipment industries converged in the late 1980s, and a period of rapid growth and technological development ensued, firms began establishing R&D alliances at an unprecedented rate in order to spread the risks and costs of technology development and to gain access to new competencies (Duysters and Hagedoorn 1996). Although alliance formation has slowed somewhat since its peak around the mid-90s (Hagedoorn 2002), R&D collaboration continues to be an important element of firm strategy in these sectors.

The Alliance Sample

To compile our sample of alliances, we identified all firms active in any four-digit SIC within SICs 366 or 367 in each of our sample years from Compustat, and compiled information on all R&D alliance announcements involving these firms from Jan 1, 1996 through Dec 31, 2004 as recorded in the Securities Data Company (SDC) Database on Alliances and Joint Ventures.⁷ This process yielded a total

⁷ The SDC database is compiled from publicly available sources such as SEC filings, news reports, as well as industry and trade journals, and contains information on alliances of all types. SDC initiated systematic deal tracking around 1989 but coverage is still far from complete, as firms are not required to report their alliance activities.

of 705 alliances. Some of these alliances linked two or more firms active in SIC 366 and/or 367, while others linked one or more firms from within the sector with a firm (or firms) from other industries.

SDC reports announcement dates for all alliances recorded in the database, but these are not always accurate (Anand & Khanna, 2000). We therefore checked all announcement dates against multiple periodicals and wire services using the Dow Jones News Retrieval service. This process prompted us to revise the announcement date for 241 alliances and to drop 137 alliances for which 1) we could find no reliable report of the alliance announcement, 2) the actual announcement date was outside of our 9-year window, or 3) the announcement related to ongoing alliance activities rather than to the initiation of a new venture.

A major concern in event study analysis is potential contamination by “confounding events” which may lead to abnormal returns for firms in the sample, but which are unrelated to the event of interest. To ensure that we could viably associate observed abnormal returns with specific alliance announcements, we excluded from our sample all alliances whose event window included the announcement of another alliance in the same 4-digit SIC. For example, on August 13, 1997, AMD, Micron Technology, and Motorola announced a joint venture related to production of deep sub-micron semiconductor devices. The next day, National Semiconductor Corporation and Three-Five Systems announced an alliance associated with silicon crystal displays. Both of these alliances include participants that are involved in SIC 3674 (semiconductor devices). Since each of these alliances “contaminates” the effect of the other, we exclude both alliances from our sample.⁸

Nevertheless, this database currently represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information on alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; McGahan & Villalonga, 2005; Oxley & Sampson, 2004.)

⁸ In addition to conflicting alliances, we have to be concerned about other unrelated events that may take place during the event window, which also may lead to abnormal returns that contaminate our results. Although it is infeasible to account for every potential conflicting event for the repeated event windows involving the hundreds of firms in our rival sample, we exclude at least those events most likely to be contaminated by dropping observations that involved those firms that we identified as being the most “active” in the sense that there are newspaper reports of important strategic moves (mergers or acquisitions, major new product announcements, executive succession, major foreign investment, etc.) on virtually a weekly if not daily basis; this represents a total of 28 firms in our rivals samples, including such obvious candidates as Microsoft, Intel and AT&T.

Identification of Rivals

We identified rivals of allying firms via the SIC information offered for each firm in the Compustat database. Compustat provides up to ten 4-digit SIC codes for each firm in its database, self-reported by the firms. In addition, Compustat identifies a primary SIC for each firm, again self-reported. We used both a broad and a narrow approach to identify rivals, similar to approaches used in prior research (e.g., McGahan & Silverman 2006). For the “All SIC rivals” sample we identified rivals for each alliance as follows: First, for each alliance, we identified all of the 4-digit SICs in which any of the alliance partners participated and that were within SIC 366 or 367 (the “partner SICs”). Next, we identified as a rival every firm in Compustat that had at least one 4-digit SIC that overlapped with at least one partner SIC and that was not itself a partner in the alliance.⁹ For example, Motorola and Schlumberger announced an alliance on February 11, 1997. In 1997, Compustat listed Motorola as participating in SICs 3661, 3663, 3674, 3679, 3714, and 4812. The first four of these SICs are within SICs 366-337 and are thus relevant to this study. Schlumberger participated in several SICs, none of which were within SIC 366 or 367. We identify every firm other than Motorola that, according to Compustat, participates in 3661, 3663, 3674, or 3679 as a rival in the context of this alliance. Thus, we assume that when an alliance is formed that involves a firm active to any degree in, say, SIC 3674, then any other firm that participates to any degree in SIC 3674 and that is not one of the partners in the alliance is a relevant rival.

Our second approach identified “Primary SIC rivals.” This is analogous to the All SIC rivals approach except that for both partners and rivals, we relied on the primary SIC rather than on all reported

⁹ Given the large data demands associated with collecting and compiling rivals’ stock market reactions we limit our attention to rivals within the industries covered by SIC 366-367. One concern with this is that we may not always be capturing the “right” rival. If, for example, an alliance consists solely of firm A developing and licensing important technology to firm B for cash, then the most relevant rivals are arguably those firms that compete with firm B. Rivals of firm A may not experience any abnormal return if firm A is simply getting cash. For intra-industry (“horizontal”) alliances this concern is moot, since rivals of firm A are also rivals of firm B. For inter-industry alliances that are bidirectional, our approach also is appropriate because rivals of each partner should experience an effect. Only for inter-industry “unilateral” alliances where the non-366-367 partner is the technology recipient might we be concerned that we are not capturing the full effect of the alliance on rival returns. As it turns out, according to SDC almost all of the alliances in our sample involve co-development and are essentially bidirectional in nature, as is characteristic of R&D alliances (see, e.g., Sampson, 2004); less than 5% are unilateral in the sense indicated above. Robustness checks indicate that our results are not sensitive to inclusion of a unilateral licensing agreement variable; the interaction of this term with the variable for horizontal alliances is also insignificant. (These results, not reported in the results section below, are available from the authors on request).

SICs. Thus, in the Motorola-Schlumberger example given above, Motorola's primary SIC is 3663. We identify every firm other than Motorola that, according to Compustat, has the primary SIC of 3663 as a rival.

Stock Market Data

We collected daily stock price data for each firm (both rivals and partners) along with the relevant daily benchmark local price index,¹⁰ from January 1, 1995 through January 31, 2005 using Datastream Advance and CRSP. This process led to additional sample attrition as we dropped observations for firms that did not have sufficient stock price data to meet the minimum data requirement for estimation of the market model and calculation of event cumulative abnormal returns (from 170 days before to 3 days after the event date).

At the end of this process, we have participant abnormal returns and rival abnormal returns for 289 alliances in the "ALLSIC" sample and 166 alliances in the "PRIMSIC" sample. The number of rivals associated with an alliance varies widely, based primarily on the SICs in which the alliance partners participate. Table 2a provides information on the number of rivals associated with each SIC.

Calculation of the Dependent Variable

We use standard event study methodology to estimate the stock market's assessment of the change in value accruing to partner and rival firms on the announcement of an alliance. This involves implementing the following procedure for each partner or rival firm for each relevant alliance "event":¹¹

(i) estimate a market model of each firm's stock returns during an estimation period prior to the event date $t=0$. Following prior research (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997; McGahan and Villalonga, 2005), we use an estimation period of 150 days, beginning on day $t=-170$ and ending on day $t=-21$, and estimate the following equation for each stock:

¹⁰In the analysis reported here we restrict attention to firms listed on the NYSE and the market index is the value-weighted S&P 500. As a robustness check (results not shown) we also ran regressions with samples that included firms listed on non-US exchanges. These regressions produced very similar results.

¹¹ Because there are multiple alliance announcements in each 4-digit SIC industry in our sample, every rival experiences multiple events, and we have one observation for each rival-deal pair. For details of how this is implemented, see http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/multiple_event_dates.htm

$$r_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i r_{m_t} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where r_{it} denotes the daily return for firm i on day t , r_{m_t} represents the corresponding daily return for the value-weighted S&P 500, α_i and β_i are firm-specific parameters and ε_{it} is distributed iid.

(ii) use the estimated coefficients from this model, (α_i and β_i), to predict daily returns for each firm i over the “event window” – i.e. in the days immediately surrounding the alliance announcement:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i r_{m_t}$$

where R_{it} denotes the predicted daily return for firm i on day t . For our study we used three event windows: a 2-day window [-1,0], a three-day window [-1,+1] and a seven-day window [-3,+3]

(iii) compute the abnormal returns (ARs) for each firm i on each day of the event window by subtracting the predicted return R_{it} from the actual return r_{it} ; and

(iv) compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm i by adding the ARs over the event window.

This procedure yields the following dependent variables, which we construct for each rival relevant to each alliance:

Rival CAR2, Rival CAR3, Rival CAR7 = the cumulative abnormal returns (as percent of a firm’s market value) experienced by a rival around an alliance announcement, over a 2-day [-1,0], 3-day [-1, 1], and 7-day [-3, 3] window, respectively.

Independent Variables

The two views of alliances generate conflicting predictions for the relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of alliance partners and those of the partners’ rivals. We construct Partner CAR2, Partner CAR3, Partner CAR7, defined as the unweighted average of the cumulative abnormal returns as a percent of a firm’s market value experienced by all partners (for whom we have return data) in a given alliance, constructed over a 2-day, 3-day, and 7-day window, respectively. We construct each partner’s CAR using the same method as for Rival CAR.

We measure Horizontal Alliance as a categorical variable equal to 1 if all of the alliance partners share the same Primary 4-digit SIC; 0 otherwise. If our argument is correct, and competition attenuation is

particularly likely in alliances whose partners compete in the same product market, then this variable should have a positive coefficient.¹²

The SDC data provides information on several other alliance characteristics that have been featured in prior studies of returns to alliance partners and/or that are particularly relevant to our analysis: We measure Cross-Border Alliance as a categorical variable equal to 1 if the alliance involves activities performed in at least two countries, and 0 otherwise. We measure Joint Venture as a categorical variable equal to 1 if the alliance involves the establishment of a stand-alone equity joint venture, and 0 otherwise.¹³ We measure R&D Plus as a categorical variable equal to 1 if the alliance involves manufacturing or marketing activities as well as R&D activities, and 0 if the alliance only involves R&D activities. Finally, we measure Multilateral as a categorical variable equal to 1 if the alliance involves more than two partners, and 0 otherwise. Our arguments regarding the greater likelihood of resource accumulation, along with difficulties in coordinating market actions in cross-border alliances, suggest that the Cross-Border Alliance variable should have a negative coefficient. As noted earlier, the effects of the other alliance characteristics are more ambiguous: a joint venture structure and broader operations are likely to facilitate both resource-accumulation and possibly the type of market coordination that would result in competition attenuation. Multilateral alliances also potentially create greater opportunities for both market coordination and resource accumulation, but the difficulties associated with managing multilateral alliances could also undermine these benefits. Consequently we do not make predictions regarding the sign of these coefficients, but include the variables as potentially important controls.

Industry characteristics

The industrial organization literature suggests that industry structure should affect the feasibility of competition attenuation through an alliance – and most particularly through a horizontal (intra-

¹² As a robustness check and a link to prior research (e.g., Berg & Friedman, 1981) we replicated our regressions using an alternative measure of Horizontal Alliance, based on 3-digit primary SIC codes of the allying partners. Results are substantively the same as those reported below, except that significance is reduced in some cases. This is as one might expect: apart from exceptional cases, one would not expect that formation of a new alliance would affect the level of competition across the breadth of markets captured at the 3-digit SIC level.

¹³ According to information provided in the SDC database regarding equity purchases and cross-holdings, none of the “non-JV” alliances in our sample involve minority equity holdings between the partners but rather are contract-based R&D alliances.

industry) alliance. Put simply, in an oligopoly it is likely that coordinated action between two firms can influence industry profitability, while in a highly fragmented industry such action is less likely to attenuate competition (Tirole 1988). To capture this potential effect we measure C4 Ratio as follows: For each 4-digit SIC in each year, we aggregate the total sales of all firms in Compustat that list this SIC as their Primary SIC. We then sum the sales of the four largest firms that list this SIC as their Primary SIC. Finally, we divide this sum by the aggregate sales for the SIC. Note that this is not identical to the conventional definition of C4 ratio, which would include in the denominator sales from all firms and not just those that are public firms (and therefore listed in Compustat). Nevertheless, to the extent that Compustat captures the majority of sales volume in an industry, this measure will be a good approximation of the four-firm concentration ratio. We also calculate an equivalent measure for the eight-firm concentration ratio, C8 Ratio, and construct interaction terms between each of these measures and the Horizontal Alliance variable.

Firm characteristics and alliance context: Exploring alternative explanations

In addition to the variables related to our focal explanations for the impact of alliance formation on rivals' returns, we also created variables for robustness checks addressing some alternative explanations for the observed results. These alternative explanations (discussed in more detail below) include the generation of technology spillovers that may benefit rivals and demonstration effects.

Prior literature suggests that certain characteristics of rival firms could change the influence of an alliance on rivals. In particular, to the extent that an alliance generates innovation that may potentially spill over to rivals, a rival's overall technological capability and its proximity to the alliance partners in technology space should both enable the rival to obtain spillovers, thus muting the negative impact (or enhancing the positive impact) of an alliance. We include two measures that together capture the magnitude of a particular rival's technological capability and the extent of overlap of the rival's capabilities with those of alliance participants: Log Citation-Weighted Patents is the natural log of the number of patents granted to rival i that have application dates during the four years prior to the alliance announcement, multiplied by the number of forward citations received by these patents. To construct the Technological Overlap measure, we first generate the technological portfolio for every participant or rival

firm in our sample (and for every year in which a given firm has a relevant event) by measuring the distribution across patent classifications of the patents applied for in the four years prior to the alliance announcement. This distribution is captured by a multidimensional vector, $F_i = (F_i^1 \dots F_i^s)$, where F_i^s represents the number of patents assigned to firm i in patent class s . We then calculate the technological overlap between a given rival and each participant firm in the alliance, and use the maximum overlap value as our measure. Thus, for rival i we have:

$$\text{Technological Overlap} = \text{Max} \left\{ \frac{F_i F_j'}{\sqrt{(F_i F_i')(F_j F_j')}} \right\}$$

where j indexes each of the participant firms in the focal alliance. Technological overlap varies from zero to one: a value of zero indicates no overlap between the rival and any of the participants' areas of technological expertise, while a value of one indicates complete overlap.

Prior research also suggests that firm size can affect the cumulative abnormal returns experienced by partner firms (see summaries of prior findings in Table 1), since these returns are measured as a percent of market value, which is usually correlated with size. To ensure that our results are not driven by a similar effect among rivals, as a robustness check we control for rival's size with Log Sales measured as the natural log of net sales revenue for rival i in the year of the alliance announcement.

There is some evidence from prior M&A research in the finance field (see, e.g., Weston, *et al*, 2004 for a review) that such events may affect rivals' stock value through a "demonstration effect." Drawing the analogy for alliances, it is possible that rivals' market values could increase not because of the attenuation of competition, but because the alliance "demonstrates" to other firms how to achieve greater efficiency.¹⁴ There are reasons to suspect that this mechanism is less likely to be active for alliances than for mergers or acquisitions: merger activity is usually quite low in most industries and then occurs in waves, in contrast the average industry in our sample experiences alliance announcements every few weeks. To the extent that an event demonstrates a brand new way to create value that has escaped attention before, this seems less likely in a world of such frequent events. Nonetheless, we construct an additional variable, Prior Alliances in Primary SIC which is a count variable of R&D alliance

¹⁴ We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

announcements at the four-digit SIC level over the past 2 years (i.e., a measure of alliance activity by industry). To the extent that a demonstration effect is in play we would expect to see a negative coefficient on this variable since the first (or early) alliances in a new “wave” of alliance activity within an industry will have more information content than later alliances.

A related issue to an industry-wide demonstration effect is the issue of repeat alliances among the same participants. Just as “leading” alliances in an industry may have higher information content for rivals (and stock market participants) than alliances coming at the end of a wave, so the first alliance linking particular participants may also have greater information content than subsequent alliances. To account for this possibility we construct another control variable, Prior Alliances Among Partners which is also a count variable, this time counting the prior linkages over the past 2 years among pairs of firms in the current alliance.

Tables 2b and 2c provide descriptive statistics for the above-defined variables, for the Primary-SIC and All-SIC samples, respectively.

Estimation and results

To establish a baseline result, and link to prior research, we examine the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to alliance participants (Table 3) before moving on to our analysis of rivals. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Madhavan and Prescott, 1995; Anand & Khanna, 2000) we find that alliance participants indeed experience positive and significant abnormal returns in the window surrounding the alliance announcement. Average 2-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to participants for whom we have return data is 1.64% for our sample of alliances having one or more participants whose *primary* industry designation is in SIC 366-367; for the sample of alliances involving one or more participants with any recorded activity in SIC 366-367 the average 2-day CAR is 1.28%. As noted earlier, prior studies have found cumulative abnormal returns ranging from just above zero to nearly 1.8%. Our means are at the high end of this range but still largely comparable.¹⁵

¹⁵ One way analysis of variance (not reported) does not reveal any significant differences in partner returns based on governance structure of the alliance – i.e., joint venture versus non-equity alliance, domestic versus cross-border

We now turn to the heart of our analysis: the effect of alliance announcements on rivals of the participant firms. In contrast to alliance participants, the average abnormal returns experienced by rivals when an alliance is announced is insignificantly different from zero (Table 4). Rivals defined by matching primary SIC with participants (the PRIMSIC sample) have small positive average returns while firms included in the ALLSIC sample under the more relaxed definition of rivalry (any activity in an overlapping 4-digit SIC industry) experience a slightly negative return on average. In each case the high variance in the returns mean that these differences are not statistically distinguishable from zero.¹⁶

Caution is warranted in interpreting simple statistics on rival returns, however, since the number of rivals per alliance varies widely and there is likely to be significant correlation in the individual rival returns to a particular announcement. In addition, because the dependent variable (CAR) is itself an estimate, with the level of precision varying across observations, there is undoubtedly heteroskedasticity in the data. To better assess the significance and correlates of rivals' reactions to alliance announcements, we therefore use regression models that include variables that we have argued are related to the potential for competition attenuation following alliance formation. We follow Saxonhouse (1976) and use weighted least squares regression in these estimations, with the weight for each observation being the square root of the standard error from the corresponding market model regression. Tables 5 and 6 present results of this analysis, based on 2-day returns: Table 5 explores the impact of alliance and industry characteristics related to our focal explanations for the impact of alliance announcements on rivals' returns; Table 6 examines the effect of other firm characteristics and prior alliances to assess the importance of technology spillovers and/or demonstration effects in determining rival returns. In both Table 5 and Table 6 models

alliance, or horizontal versus vertical alliance. Simple bivariate regression does indicate, however, that partner returns are negatively related to firm size (significant at the 1% level), again consistent with prior research.

¹⁶ It is of interest to compare these returns to rivals of alliance participants with the average returns to rivals that Eckbo (1983) found in his study of contested merger deals. Using a similar 2-day event window, the average CAR experienced by the rivals of target firms upon announcement of a merger proposal was also insignificant in Eckbo's study, except for those proposals that were subsequently challenged by the Justice department, where rival returns were positive (0.74%) and significant. However, to put this in context, *target* firms in the same deals experienced 2-day cumulative abnormal returns in the range of 6-10%. It is not possible to make a similar comparison to Stillman (1983) since he reports only 1-day abnormal returns for returns to rivals in 11 contested merger cases. However, he reports that rivals' returns were positive and significant (at the 5% level) in 2 of the 11 cases.

1-3 show results of estimations using the PRIMSIC sample of rivals and models 4-6 are for estimations using the ALLSIC sample.

Looking first at the results in Table 5 we immediately see a result which, on its face, appears quite at odds with a competitiveness-enhancing view of alliances: the cumulative abnormal returns experienced by rivals are *positively* related to participant returns in both rival samples. In other words, the bigger the bump (or loss) that the stock market gives to participants in an alliance, the bigger the bump (or loss) that it awards to participants' rivals. This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of alliance and industry characteristics and is difficult to reconcile with the idea that forming an alliance makes alliance participants more potent rivals.

Models 1 & 4 in Table 5 also indicate that in both the PRIMSIC and ALLSIC samples horizontal alliances (i.e. alliances joining industry competitors) are associated with more positive CARs for rivals than are alliances that join firms whose primary activities are in different industries – the coefficient on the Horizontal Alliance variable is positive and significant. When we add the concentration ratio (either C4 or C8) and its interaction with Horizontal the main effect of Horizontal becomes insignificant, but in the PRIMSIC sample the interaction terms Horizontal*C4 and Horizontal*C8 are positive and significant. Horizontal alliances *per se* do not generate positive abnormal returns for rivals; rather, it appears to be horizontal alliances in highly concentrated industries that generate this effect, consistent with the theoretical arguments. This effect is not statistically significant in the ALLSIC sample, but this is perhaps unsurprising given the looser definition of rivalry in this sample.

Cross-border alliances, where the alliance covers operations in multiple countries, appear to be less likely to generate positive returns to rivals than are domestic alliances: the coefficient on cross-border alliance is consistently negative and highly significant in the PRIMSIC sample; again the effect in the ALLSIC sample is not significant. The PRIMSIC result is consistent with the argument that cross-border alliances are more likely to entail the introduction and joining of new, complementary skills, and are less suited to the type of product market coordination that could potentially benefit rivals.

Evidence is more equivocal when it comes to the governance form of the alliance, the involvement of multiple partners, or the inclusion of manufacturing and/or marketing activities within the

scope of the alliance – all alliance features that could facilitate *either* inter-partner learning and resource accumulation *or* the coordination of production and investment plans that could in turn soften competition in the industry: The coefficient on JV is insignificant in both samples, as is the coefficient on the Multilateral Alliance variable. R&D Plus carries a *negative* coefficient (although again significant only in the PRIMSIC sample), suggesting that the improved innovation outcomes associated with combining R&D and manufacturing lead to greater competitiveness for alliance participants, and more negative returns for rivals.

Table 6 displays the results of regressions that address alternative explanations for the results in Table 5. To test for the possibility of a “demonstration effect” or other context-dependent variation in the information content of a new alliance announcement, models 1 and 4 in Table 6 add our measure of prior alliances in the rival’s primary 4-digit SIC industry, and the count of prior alliances among the participants in the focal alliance. First note that the number of prior alliances at the industry level has no significant impact on rivals’ returns upon announcement of the new alliance. This is consistent with our intuition that, in contrast to merger activity, alliance formation does not occur in significant waves and, in a world of relatively frequent events, the likelihood that a new alliance demonstrates a brand new way to create value that has escaped attention before is much lower. In contrast, the coefficient on Prior Alliances among Partners is consistently negative and significant. This suggests that rivals’ stock price is indeed less likely to rise (or more likely to fall) when subsequent alliances joining the same participants are announced, relative to their first alliance. There are two explanations that are consistent with this finding, both of which are in line with our previous discussion. First, if Fusfeld’s (1958) suspicion is correct, then any opportunities for market coordination (collusion) open to the alliance partners are likely to be discovered and exploited by them through the “close association and collaboration” that stems – at least in his view - from the initiation of any alliance linking the partners, however small. Second, to the extent that the discovery of true synergies and learning opportunities among the partners is more complex and time-consuming than simple market coordination, then later alliances joining the same partners may be more likely to generate new valuable resources and tip the net effect in favor of competitiveness enhancement than are early alliances.

A second class of alternative explanations for a positive correlation between participant and rival returns upon announcement of a new R&D alliance involves the possibility that investors foresee the prospect of development of new technology that will then spill over to rivals. This is a rather indirect route to enhanced industry profitability – it must of course also be the case that competition does not completely eradicate returns generated by the new technology – but it is nonetheless an interesting possibility to investigate. We do this by looking at the impact of firm characteristics, particularly as they relate to the “absorptive capacity” of rivals (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Thus in models 2 and 5 of Table 6 we introduce Log Sales, Log Citation-Weighted Patents and Technological Overlap, and also combine these with the prior alliance measures to create fully-specified regression estimations in models 3 and 6.

The results provide little evidence of spillover effects: While the coefficient on Log Sales is positive and significant across specifications, rival’s technological capability – as captured by Log Citation-Weighted Patents – is significantly negatively associated with rival returns in the PRIMSIC sample, counter to the notion of greater absorptive capacity for technologically capable firms. Further, absorptive capacity logically depends on the extent of technology overlap between rival and alliance participants (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 1996; Lane & Lubatkin 1998), and the insignificant coefficient on Technological Overlap indicates no evidence of any effect of technology overlap on rivals’ CARs. This reinforces the notion that a positive impact on rival CARs reflects the market’s expectation of competition-attenuation in an industry following alliance formation, at least in an important subset of alliances.

Conclusions

This paper began with a concern about the alliance literature: as this literature has matured, it has increasingly adopted the assumption that alliances are mechanisms for generating competitive advantage vs. rivals – that is, for becoming a fiercer competitor. We noted that prior theoretical and empirical evidence could also support an alternate view of alliances as mechanisms for softening competition in a market. Our paper drew on the industrial organization and strategy literatures to lay out these alternative

processes by which alliances create value for partners. We then conducted an unusual empirical test that – unlike prior empirical studies – could test conflicting predictions from the alternative theoretical views.

We found evidence consistent with the idea that, in the eyes of investors, some alliances are indeed expected to soften competition in an industry, thus “raising the boats” of rivals as well as partners. This was particularly true for horizontal alliances – those between firms that compete in the same downstream product market – and especially for horizontal alliances in concentrated industries, which is precisely where theory would indicate that competition-softening alliances would be most feasible. Other explanations for the positive association between partner and rival returns to alliance announcements did not stand up under further scrutiny: There is little evidence in our sample, for example, that rivals who are particularly well-situated to benefit from technological spillovers experience disproportionately positive returns; nor is there any evidence of a “demonstration effect,” whereby an early alliance announcement in a particular sector raises expectations of a coming wave of alliance activity.

Our results do not imply that *all* alliances attenuate competition, however. Cross-border alliances and R&D alliances that also involve manufacturing or marketing activities in addition to research appear to be more likely to lead to the introduction of new and complementary skills and/or increased innovation, making the participants more potent competitors and depressing the stock market value of rivals. Taken together, our results thus suggest that alliances may have *both* competitiveness-enhancing *and* competition-softening effects; which of these two effects dominates depends on both the type of alliance that is established and the context in which the alliance takes place.

Of course, our study is not without limitations. In particular, the size and complexity of the data needed for a study of rival returns meant that we were forced to restrict our attention to a fairly narrow set of industries in compiling the alliance sample. Replicating the study across different sectors would be a very useful exercise, both to further evaluate the robustness and generality of the results, as well as to dig deeper into the circumstances wherein alliances have the effect of making participant firms more potent competitors (hence increasing the intensity of competitive pressures experienced by rivals) and where/when they serve the purpose of competition-attenuation.

Another possible avenue for future research is to expand the set of organizational arrangements examined, beyond the R&D alliances that were the focus of this study. In particular, one might revisit the earlier research on the effect on rivals' returns of M&A activity and generate hypotheses about how the value of rivals would be expected to change, for example in response to a merger between R&D competitors, relative to the change in value expected from an alliance. There are certainly limits to the nuance that one can generate given the noisiness of the data surrounding second-order effects of different organizational events on rivals, but with carefully chosen research settings and a well-designed empirical strategy, one could envision a range of interesting and productive studies along these lines.

In sum, although we consider our results to be indicative rather than definitive, we believe that they provide a provocative challenge to the prevailing view that alliances are primarily or solely motivated by resource access/acquisition and improving competitive advantage vis-à-vis rivals. More broadly, we believe that the methodology employed in this study can be applied far beyond the analysis of alliances. There are significant debates in several streams of management literature about the competitive implications of strategic and policy decisions, including acquisitions, patent races, entry and expansion, and exogenous shocks to background institutions such as deregulation. By analyzing the effect of one firm's strategic action on the market value of its rivals, this methodology should be able to shine light on many of these debates.

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Table 1: Prior Event Studies of Alliance Formation

Authors	Theoretical focus / hypotheses	Data	Main findings
McConnell & Nantell (1985)	Joint ventures will generate synergy-based gains	136 joint ventures in multiple industries announced 1972-1979, compiled from <i>Mergers & Acquisitions's</i> "Joint Venture Roster" and WSJ.	JVs produce positive abnormal return (0.73%). The smaller partner enjoys a larger return (in percentage terms) than the larger firm.
Woolridge & Snow (1990)	Test basic relationship between shareholder expectations and managers' investment decisions including JV establishment.	Announcements of investment decisions from WSJ for 1972-87; 767 announcements involving 248 firms in 102 industries	JVs produce positive abnormal return (0.80%).
Koh & Venkatraman (1991)	Value of related joint ventures is greater than for unrelated ventures; applies to partner-venture relationship and relationship between partners.	175 JVs involving 239 firms in IT sector compiled from WSJ joint venture announcements, 1972-86; supplementary samples of technology, marketing & supply agreements.	Mean 2-day CAR 0.87% for JVs; tech exchange agreements also generated positive return (0.8%), related ventures create more value than unrelated; smaller partner has higher returns than larger partner.
Das, Sen and Sengupta (1998)	Strategic alliances particularly valuable to small firms in technology alliances – resource accumulation rationale	119 non-equity alliances announced in 1987-91; bilateral alliances only; Data from ITSA, CRSP, Compustat	Significant 2-day CAR of 0.008%; insignificant return for marketing alliances.
Anand and Khanna (2000)	Firms learn from experience, so market reaction to alliances increases, the more alliances the firm does; greater learning associated with JVs than licenses and for R&D JVs versus prod. or marketing JVs.	1976 manufacturing (SIC 20-39) joint ventures and licenses involving 147 firms, announced during 1990-93; data sources are SDC, CRSP, Compustat	Significant positive CARs for both JVs (0.78%) and licenses (1.78%); experience hypotheses confirmed.
Reuer & Koza (2000)	JVs are more valuable (compared to acquisition) when desired assets are intertwined with assets that are not useful, and when information asymmetries are stronger	297 JVs that terminated between 1985 and 1995; bilateral JVs only; data sources are Funk and Scott Index, Lexis-Nexis, and CRSP	JVs produce positive CAR (0.44%). CARs are significantly higher for JVs in which information asymmetry is expected to be high.
McGahan & Villalonga, (2005)	Examines firm-specific and 'deal program' effects on value generated by mergers, JVs & divestments.	7,714 deals announced by 86 members of Fortune 100 between 1990-1999; 7 types of deals distinguished; Data sources are SDC, CRSP, Compustat;	Average effect of all deal types is negative but small (2-day CAR is -0.053%); no significant difference among deal types; firm effects biggest contributor to variance; firm-governance choice interactions also significant

Table 2a: Rivals per SIC
(annual average, 1996-2004)

<i>SIC</i>	<i># PRIMSIC rivals</i>	<i># ALLSIC rivals</i>
3661	23	61
3663	39	84
3669	19	28
3672	13	43
3674	64	121
3678	6	12
3679	20	84

TABLE 2b: Descriptive Statistics
Alliance participants & PRIMARY SIC rivals

<i>Correlations (correlation, significance)</i>		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Rival CAR (2 day)	1.000													
2	Partner CAR2	0.068 0.000	1.000												
3	Horizontal Alliance	0.035 0.005	0.006 0.644	1.000											
4	Cross Border Alliance	-0.045 0.000	-0.008 0.517	0.003 0.817	1.000										
5	Joint Venture	-0.023 0.070	-0.033 0.010	-0.054 0.000	-0.167 0.000	1.000									
6	R&D Plus	-0.044 0.001	0.015 0.245	0.251 0.000	0.084 0.000	0.078 0.000	1.000								
7	Multilateral Alliance	0.001 0.937	-0.032 0.011	-0.080 0.000	-0.062 0.000	0.204 0.000	-0.045 0.000	1.000							
8	C4 (by primary SIC)	-0.060 0.000	0.073 0.000	-0.286 0.000	0.003 0.789	-0.047 0.000	-0.155 0.000	0.140 0.000	1.000						
9	C8 (by primary SIC)	-0.054 0.000	0.074 0.000	-0.287 0.000	-0.016 0.207	-0.054 0.000	-0.153 0.000	0.150 0.000	0.986 0.000	1.000					
10	Prior alliances among partners	-0.049 0.000	-0.078 0.000	-0.075 0.000	0.083 0.000	0.054 0.000	-0.090 0.000	0.418 0.000	0.084 0.000	0.080 0.000	1.000				
11	Prior alliances in primary SIC	-0.055 0.000	-0.111 0.000	-0.055 0.000	0.170 0.000	-0.031 0.013	-0.073 0.000	0.104 0.000	-0.048 0.000	-0.140 0.000	0.194 0.000	1.000			
12	Log Sales (rival)	0.052 0.000	-0.004 0.744	0.078 0.000	0.007 0.588	-0.003 0.816	0.037 0.004	-0.040 0.002	-0.237 0.000	-0.230 0.000	-0.017 0.192	-0.020 0.118	1.000		
13	Log citation-weighted patent count (rival)	0.024 0.054	-0.022 0.084	0.071 0.000	0.019 0.134	0.021 0.094	0.027 0.030	-0.021 0.088	-0.316 0.000	-0.320 0.000	0.021 0.094	0.100 0.000	0.559 0.000	1.000	
14	Technological overlap (rival-participant)	0.022 0.099	-0.011 0.401	0.011 0.415	0.051 0.000	0.065 0.000	-0.001 0.952	0.072 0.000	-0.073 0.000	-0.098 0.000	0.072 0.000	0.166 0.000	0.339 0.000	0.485 0.000	1.000
	Mean	0.001	0.022	0.155	0.120	0.170	0.322	0.124	0.576	0.718	0.357	81.067	4.677	3.122	0.236
	Median	-0.002	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.504	0.648	0.000	66.000	4.732	3.219	0.147
	Minimum	-0.725	-0.144	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.369	0.543	0.000	1.000	-4.605	0.000	0.000
	Maximum	1.770	0.611	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.882	0.985	13.000	228.000	9.436	10.591	0.994
	Std. Dev.	0.080	0.067	0.362	0.325	0.376	0.467	0.330	0.157	0.133	1.710	60.582	1.822	2.489	0.255
	# of observations	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	6345	5999	6345	5726

TABLE 2c: Descriptive Statistics
Alliance participants & ALL SIC rivals

		<i>Correlations (correlation, significance)</i>													
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Rival CAR (2 day)	1.000													
2	Partner CAR2	0.031 0.000	1.000												
3	Horizontal Alliance	0.021 0.001	0.049 0.000	1.000											
4	Cross Border Alliance	-0.012 0.058	-0.010 0.131	0.024 0.000	1.000										
5	Joint Venture	0.009 0.147	-0.075 0.000	-0.036 0.000	-0.169 0.000	1.000									
6	R&D Plus	-0.007 0.300	0.008 0.234	0.195 0.000	0.018 0.005	0.164 0.000	1.000								
7	Multilateral Alliance	0.011 0.085	-0.038 0.000	-0.078 0.000	-0.080 0.000	0.070 0.000	-0.082 0.000	1.000							
8	C4 (by primary SIC)	-0.021 0.001	0.037 0.000	-0.123 0.000	0.020 0.001	-0.092 0.000	-0.077 0.000	0.002 0.710	1.000						
9	C8 (by primary SIC)	-0.022 0.001	0.034 0.000	-0.133 0.000	0.009 0.178	-0.090 0.000	-0.081 0.000	0.020 0.002	0.983 0.000	1.000					
10	Prior alliances among partners	-0.010 0.128	-0.016 0.012	-0.075 0.000	-0.077 0.000	0.266 0.000	0.127 0.000	0.237 0.000	-0.039 0.000	-0.022 0.001	1.000				
11	Prior alliances in primary SIC	0.020 0.002	0.011 0.076	0.036 0.000	0.210 0.000	-0.069 0.000	-0.001 0.855	-0.073 0.000	0.135 0.000	0.066 0.000	-0.130 0.000	1.000			
12	Log Sales (rival)	-0.003 0.721	-0.006 0.384	0.046 0.000	-0.028 0.000	0.027 0.000	0.028 0.000	0.019 0.008	-0.255 0.000	-0.249 0.000	0.034 0.000	-0.137 0.000	1.000		
13	Log citation-weighted patent count (rival)	0.009 0.172	-0.007 0.305	0.015 0.018	0.009 0.165	0.033 0.000	0.017 0.006	0.004 0.569	-0.193 0.000	-0.194 0.000	0.021 0.001	-0.018 0.004	0.542 0.000	1.000	
14	Technological overlap (rival-participant)	0.001 0.871	-0.028 0.000	0.038 0.000	0.050 0.000	0.026 0.000	0.028 0.000	0.056 0.000	-0.117 0.000	-0.133 0.000	0.046 0.000	0.128 0.000	0.399 0.000	0.423 0.000	1.000
	Mean	0.000	0.018	0.077	0.099	0.206	0.291	0.135	0.625	0.760	0.976	59.425	4.903	2.815	0.187
	Median	-0.004	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.712	0.843	0.000	34.000	4.792	2.639	0.095
	Minimum	-0.864	-0.144	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.369	0.543	0.000	0.000	-4.605	0.000	0.000
	Maximum	8.918	0.611	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	31.000	228.000	10.534	10.591	1.000
	Std. Dev.	0.097	0.066	0.267	0.299	0.404	0.454	0.342	0.163	0.138	3.475	67.356	2.112	2.671	0.224
	# of observations	25073	25073	25073	25073	25073	25073	25073	24946	24946	25073	25073	18921	25073	22243

Table 3: Returns to Alliance Participants

		Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	# of obs.
“PRIMARY SIC” sample	1. Partner CAR2 (%)	1.64**	10.48	-16.39	130.4	403
	2. Partner CAR3 (%)	2.26**	14.15	-16.68	163.8	403
	3. Partner CAR7 (%)	2.34**	15.45	-41.33	168.5	403
“All-SIC” sample	4. Partner CAR2 (%)	1.28**	9.05	-17.55	130.4	740
	5. Partner CAR3 (%)	1.60**	11.97	-46.89	163.8	740
	6. Partner CAR7 (%)	1.68**	13.45	-50.36	168.6	740

** = $p < .05$; * = $p < .10$ (for null hypothesis, mean=0)

Table 4: Returns to Alliance Rivals

		Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	# of obs.
“PRIMARY SIC” rivals	1. Rival CAR2 (%)	0.121	0.080	-0.725	1.770	6345
	2. Rival CAR3 (%)	0.130	0.094	-0.949	1.660	6345
	3. Rival CAR7 (%)	0.221	0.140	-1.325	2.530	6345
“All-SIC” rivals	4. Rival CAR2 (%)	-0.012	0.097	-0.864	8.918	25073
	5. Rival CAR3 (%)	-0.072	0.108	-1.201	8.862	25073
	6. Rival CAR7 (%)	-0.068	0.151	-2.629	7.972	25073

** = $p < .05$; * = $p < .10$ (for null hypothesis, mean=0)

Table 5: Effect of Alliance Characteristics and Industry Characteristics on Rival CARs

	----- PRIMSIC sample -----			----- ALLSIC sample -----		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partner CAR	0.050 *	0.054 **	0.053 *	0.034 **	0.034 **	0.035 **
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Horizontal Alliance	0.008 *	-0.019	-0.031	0.009 *	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.025)
Cross-Border Alliance	-0.013 ***	-0.013 ***	-0.013 ***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Joint Venture	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
R&D Plus	-0.008 *	-0.008 *	-0.008 *	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Multilateral Alliance	0.002	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
C4 Ratio		-0.040 ***			-0.014 **	
		(0.014)			(0.007)	
Horizontal * C4		0.045 **			0.012	
		(0.022)			(0.025)	
C8 Ratio			-0.047 ***			-0.017 **
			(0.016)			(0.008)
Horizontal * C8			0.052 **			0.010
			(0.025)			(0.031)
Constant	0.000	0.025 **	0.025 **	-0.005 ***	0.004	0.008
	(0.003)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.007)
N	6345	6345	6345	25073	24946	24946
R-square	0.015	0.025	0.024	0.004	0.005	0.005
F-statistic	2.91 **	7.64 ***	8.56 ***	1.90 *	2.60 ***	2.61 ***
Number of clusters	166	166	166	289	285	285

- OLS regression, robust standard errors, clustered on deal

- *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for 2-tailed tests

- Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 6: Exploring Alternative Explanations

	----- PRIMSIC sample -----			----- ALLSIC sample -----		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partner CAR	0.051 ** (0.026)	0.079 ** (0.040)	0.075 * (0.039)	0.035 ** (0.015)	0.039 (0.025)	0.039 (0.025)
Horizontal Alliance	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.017)
Cross-Border Alliance	-0.012 ** (0.005)	-0.015 *** (0.005)	-0.014 *** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007 * (0.004)
Joint Venture	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
R&D Plus	-0.008 ** (0.004)	-0.010 ** (0.004)	-0.010 ** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Multilateral Alliance	0.008 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
C4 Ratio	-0.041 *** (0.014)	-0.045 *** (0.015)	-0.045 *** (0.015)	-0.017 ** (0.007)	-0.017 ** (0.008)	-0.021 *** (0.008)
Horizontal * C4	0.045 ** (0.021)	0.057 ** (0.027)	0.057 ** (0.027)	0.014 (0.024)	0.027 (0.027)	0.031 (0.026)
Prior alliances among partners	-0.002 *** (0.001)		-0.002 *** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)
Prior alliances in primary SIC	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 *** (0.000)
Log Sales (rival)		0.002 ** (0.001)	0.002 ** (0.001)		0.001 * (0.000)	0.001 ** (0.000)
Log Citation-weighted patents (rival)		-0.002 ** (0.001)	-0.002 ** (0.001)		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Technological Overlap (rival-partner)		0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)		0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Constant	0.026 ** (0.011)	0.021 * (0.011)	0.020 * (0.012)	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)
N	6345	5491	5491	24946	16282	16282
R-square	0.027	0.037	0.040	0.007	0.007	0.012
F-statistic	7.57 ***	6.57 ***	6.04 ***	3.19 ***	1.82 *	2.92 ***
Number of clusters	166	152	152	285	285	285

- OLS regression, robust standard errors, clustered on deal

- *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for 2-tailed tests

- Robust standard errors in parentheses