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Travaux en cours

1. The quality of governance and the use of negotiated procurement procedures: Some (un-)surprising evidence from the European Union

With Eshien Chong (Sorbonne School of Business) & Michael Klien (Sorbonne School of Business)

Abstract: Public procurement represents a significant part of GDP in the European Union (more than 17%). Apart from classical open auctions, public authorities can also use negotiated procedures to award contracts. The discretion associated with nego- tiations is, however, often supposed to provide room for corruption and favoritism. This potential drawback has been a key driver of the latest procurement reforms at the European level. In this paper we correlate the use of these suspect procure- ment procedures (i.e. negotiated procedures with or without call for competition) with measures of the quality of governance, at the country and regional level. We use a European data set containing information concerning public procurements in the 27 European countries, over the 2008-2012 period. This leads us to work with information on more than 680 000 public procurement contracts in more than 150 subnational regions (NUTS levels). We combine this data with a new dataset on governance quality and corruption, which expands World Bank Indicators (Kauf- mann et al. 2010) to the regional level. Using an instrumental variable strategy, our econometric results suggest that the use of public procurement contracts that are directly negotiated without any call for competition are significantly associated with environments that do not provide a good quality of governance (i.e. regions and countries with prevalent corruption). However, public procurement contracts where a negotiation phase exists with competition are more probably associated with environments that provide a good quality of governance. These results suggest that the discussed new European Directive on public procurement might be misleading in not distinguishing between different types of negotiated procedures.


2. Renegotiations and Contract Renewals in Public-Private Arrangements. An Empirical Analysis.

With Jean Beuve (U. Paris I Sorbonne) &  Julie De Brux (Vinci)

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contractual relationship. Using an original data-set of 252 expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we investigate the link between renegotiations and contract renewals. Indeed, if renegotiations led to surplus decrease, then parties would not be prone to contract again together. Our econometric results reveal that some renegotiation types, their frequency and their scope clearly impact the probability to see a contract renewed as soon as public authorities have discretionary power on the decision to renew a contract with the same private partner. Hence, our results suggest a positive, negative or neutral impact on the contractual surplus depending on the kind of renegotiation and the kind of contract that is considered.

3. Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity

With Jean Beuve (U. Paris I Sorbonne) & Marian Moszoro (IESE Barcelona)

Abstract: We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of contracts for a long-term standardize product from a single provider, we find that private-to-public contracts are larger, feature more rigidity clauses, and their renegotiation is formalized in amendments. We further compare in-sample private-to-public contracts and find similar patterns rising in political contestability by several measures. We argue that a significant part of the contractual rigidity differences between purely private and public contracts arises as a political risk adap- tation of the public agent to curtail plausible challenges from political contesters and interest groups.