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Call for Papers - ESNIE 2009

ESNIE 2009
Eighth session of the European School on New Institutional Economics

ESNIE 2009, the eighth session of the European School on New Institutional Economics, will be held in Cargese (Corsica) from the 18th to the 22nd of May 2009.


INFRATRAIN Summer School - TRAINing in Applied INFRAstructure Modeling and Policy Analysis
from June 14-18, 2009 in Jönköping,
designed for junior researchers like PhD-students, post-docs, and young professionals from ministries, regulatory agencies and the private sector.

Workshop "Emerging Competition Issues in the Procurement of Infrastructure Services"

Un workshop organisé par Antonio Estache (Ecares), dont je vous avais déjà parlé (ici).

Séminaire SPOC - 6 février - Daniel ALBALATE

Le prochain séminaire SPOC aura lieu le 6 février, de 11h-12h30 à l'IAE au 21 rue Broca dans le 5ieme arrondissement.

Daniel ALBALATE (University of Barcelona) nous présentera :

CORI - Contracts data base


Often, in discussion with colleagues in conferences, comes the issue of available data concerning contractual choices made by economic actors. It appears surprisingly that few people are aware of the initiative of the CORI (Contracting and Organizations Research Institute), initiated by Ronald H. Coase and Kenneth Lehn by the mid 90's. The CORI K-Base now includes almost 700,000 contracts, most obtained from corporate disclosure filings. More than 440, 000 of them are available on line. The contracts are accessible via full-text and defined category search queries. Everything is on the CORI web page.

EEM 09

Carine Staropoli sera présente à la 6ième international conference on the european energy market (EEM) qui a lieu du 27 au 29 mai 2009. Pour plus d'informations sur cette conférence c'est ici.

Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries

Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Insights from Jean-Jacques Laffont’s last book

Antonio Estache, a good friend of mine and one of my favourite author wrote a very interesting paper on the lessons that can be learned from Jean-Jacques Laffont's papers on institutions and development. The paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Litterature. One of the main argument is that "Developing economies are often described as “economies with missing markets.” In the contractual world of regulation, missing markets translate into incomplete contracts. Contracts are incomplete because of players’ bounded rationality, as in any economy—but also because of institutional weaknesses."

The first time I read Laffont's 2005 book on this issue I was fascinated by this idea and by the way he proposed a formalization of weak institutions and their impact on contracting choices and regulation. This paper takes stock and suggests we should go on following the path proposed by Jean-Jacques Laffont. I totally agree with this view.

Call for Papers: International Conference on Infrastructure Economics and Development

University of Toulouse (France), January 14-15, 2010.

A preliminary version of the paper must be sent, in PDF format, to before September 15, 2009.

Le PPP : un outil de management public

Un rapport rendu en Novembre 2008 par le Conseil Economique et Social de Franche-Comté sur "le Partenariat Public Privé : un Outil de Management Public".

Pour accéder au rapport

Théorie de la Firme - Nouvel article de O. Hart et B. Holmstrom

Un nouvel article de Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström. Je vous joins le résumé:

The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights, emphasizes that the ownership of assets — and thereby firm boundaries — is determined in such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It is generally accepted that this approach applies to owner-managed firms better than to large companies. In this paper, we attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach by developing a simple model with three key ingredients: (a) decision rights can be transferred ex ante through ownership, (b) managers (and possibly workers) enjoy private benefits that are non-transferable, and (c) owners can divert a firm’s profit. In our basic model decisions are ex post non-contractible; in an extension we use the idea that contracts are reference points to relax this assumption. We show that firm boundaries matter. Nonintegrated firms fail to account for the external effects that their decisions have on other firms. An integrated firm can internalize such externalities, but it does not put enough weight on the private benefits of managers and workers. We explore this tradeoff in a model that focuses on the difficulties companies face in cooperating through the market if the benefits from cooperation are unevenly divided; therefore, they may sometimes end up merging. We show that the assumption that contracts are reference points introduces a friction that permits an analysis of delegation.

Pour télécharger le papier :